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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
Alpha Security Trust, a named petitioner which is the entity which holds 
certain of the subject property, in trust, for the benefit of third parties. 
Eugene B. Lynch, one of two trustee of Alpha Security Trust. Mr. Lynch 
is representing himself in these proceedings. 
Harold Perkins, a named petitioner and owner of certain of the subject 
property. Mr. Perkins is representing himself in these proceedings. 
Board of Equalization of Rich County, State of Utah, the entity which 
originally denied petitioners' request for reduction of the assessed value 
of the subject property, resulting in petitioners' filing a Petition for 
Redetermination with the Utah State Tax Commission. 
The Utah State Tax Commission, the agency which entered the Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision which is the subject of 
the Petition for Review. 
In addition to Mr. Lynch and Mr. Perkins, Mr. Marvin Zulauf appeared 
at the formal hearing in this matter on July 7,1995. The exact role of Mr. 
Zulauf is unclear; however, he asserts a beneficial interest in the property 
of Alpha Security Trust as a beneficiary and appeared representing 
himself, Alpha Security Trust, and in a consulting or advisory capacity to 
Mr. Perkins. 
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JURISDICTION 
This case was originally filed by petitioners in the Utah Supreme Court and was 
later assigned to the Utah Court of Appeals. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-16 and 78-2-2(4). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Board of Equalization of Rich County, State of Utah (hereinafter 
"respondent") objects to the issues presented for review and the standard of review as 
set forth by petitioners in their opening brief insofar as those issues were not raised by 
petitioners below. Specifically, respondent objects to petitioners' allegations regarding 
deprivation of due process. 
Petitioners assert for the first time in their opening brief that the Commission 
inappropriately granted respondent ten days after the hearing within which to verify 
sales information, thus depriving petitioners of the opportunity to cross-examine 
respondent regarding the post-hearing information presented. In fact, the information 
that was submitted by respondent was in rebuttal of information provided by petitioners 
for the first time at the hearing. That information consisted of the hearsay opinions of 
local realtors and local real estate agents obtained and submitted by petitioners to 
1 
demonstrate decreasing property values prior to the subject tax lien date and increase 
in property values after the hen date. The individuals from whom petitioners obtained 
this information were not presented as witnesses by petitioners and were not subject 
to respondent's cross-examination. The Commission's determination that principles 
of fundamental fairness mandated that respondent be allowed to confirm or rebut that 
testimony was entirely appropriate1 and petitioners made no objection regarding post-
hearing submissions. 
Petitioners also alleged at the hearing for the first time that certain of the sales 
used by respondent's experts in the appraisals submitted into evidence involved 
transactions which were not "arms length transactions" and/or which included 
substantial personal property. Those allegations were not raised prior to the hearing 
by petitioners.2 As a result, respondent was not able to prepare to refute petitioners 
allegations at the time of the hearing. Again, petitioners made no objection to the 
Commission's ruling that the parties be allowed ten days after the hearing to refute the 
1
 In addition to being supported by equitable considerations, the Commission's decision 
to accept post-hearing submissions is supported by the Tax Commission Rules {see Note 12, infra). 
Further, it is common for the Commission to solicit and accept supplemental information from the 
parties after a hearing. See, e.g., Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Com 'n, 916 P.2d 344, 350 (Utah 
1996); Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Com 'n (ex rel. Union Pacific Railroad Co.), 1996 WL 
364749 (June 18, 1996), at 5. A true and correct copy of this case is attached as Appendix 1. 
2
 See Notes 7, 8, and 10, infra. 
2 
new information presented by petitioners. 
Petitioners also assert they were deprived of due process by reason of the 
Commission refusal to allow petitioners the opportunity to cross-examine respondent's 
witnesses and to present their case. Respondent directs the court's attention to the 
transcript of the proceedings, which clearly demonstrates the contrary is true. The first 
part of the hearing was devoted to Mr. Zulauf s presentation of petitioners' positions. 
Mr. Zulauf, who acted as the spokesman for petitioners at the formal hearing, freely 
questioned Mr. Jolley3 and the respondent's expert witnesses.4 Other than an 
occasional comment by the Commission to indicate that the time set for hearing was 
passing and an admonishment to one party or another to move on to another topic, 
neither petitioners nor Mr. Zulauf, their designated representative, was denied the 
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who appeared in behalf of the respondent. 
Finally, petitioners assert that the bulk of the hearing was devoted to the 
Commission's and respondent's challenge to the credentials of Mr. Zulauf to prepare 
and submit an appraisal for use in determining the fair market value of the subject 
3
 Transcript of proceedings ("Tr.) at pages 50-70. 
4
 Id. and Tr. 70-75. In addition, both Mr. Perkins and Mr. Lynch interjected comments 
throughout the hearing, which was conducted in a somewhat informal manner to allow the widest 
possible latitude insofar as participation by all parties was concerned. 
3 
properties. A significant portion of petitioners' post-hearing submissions dealt with 
that issue. In fact, Mr. Jolley made a motion to exclude the comparison exhibits 
prepared by Mr. Zulauf and the petitioners (hearing exhibits 2 and 3) based upon the 
fact that neither petitioners nor Mr. Zulauf is hcensed under Utah law to perform 
appraisals. That motion was denied.5 There is no evidence in the record to indicate 
that any material, be it testimony or tangible exhibit, submitted by petitioners was 
rejected as a result of the fact that petitioners and Mr. Zulauf are not hcensed to 
appraise property within the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent objects to the statement of the case presented for review set forth 
by the petitioners to the extent that it misrepresents the facts of the case and/or misleads 
the court concerning the procedural posture of the case at the time of the formal hearing 
and events leading to the formal hearing. Respondent believes that some of the 
confusion may have resulted from the fact that the petitioners did not have the benefit 
of a transcript of the formal hearing at the time petitioners' opening brief was prepared 
5
 Tr. 78-80. Of dispositive significance is that the Commission denied the motion to 
exclude the evidence presented by petitioners. In fact, Mr. Zulauf indicated that the exhibits were not 
appraisals, but merely assisted in preparing exhibits to critique the appraisals performed by the 
respondent's appraisers. Tr. 129-131. 
4 
and may, therefore, have inadvertently misstated the sequence of events. To correct 
such misstatements of fact, respondent provides the following statement of facts. 
1. On or about October 18,1994, the Rich County Board of Equalization issued a 
final decision, reducing the assessed value of parcel 41-33-28-077 (the "Lynch 
property"), owned by Alpha Security Trust, Eugene B. Lynch, Trustee ("Lynch") from 
$108,290.80 to $97,000.00. See Exhibit 1 to Lynch Notice of Appeal, R. 3046. 
2. On or about November 21,1994, Lynch filed a Notice of Appeal with the Utah 
State Tax Commission (the "Commission"), No. 94-2231, challenging the final decision 
of the Rich County Board of Equalization. R. 304. 
3. On or about October 18,1994, the Rich County Board of Equalization issued a 
final decision reducing the assessed value of parcel 37-19-01-085 (the "Perkins 
property"), owned by petitioner Harold Perkins ("Perkins") from $96,945.85 to 
$95,348.00. R. 323. 
4. On or about October 31, 1994, Perkins filed a Notice of Appeal with the 
Commission, No. 94-1680, challenging the final decision of the Rich County Board of 
Equalization. R. 320. 
6
 The specific page of the Board's final decision is not bate-stamped in the official 
record. 
5 
5. The Lynch and Perkins appeals were later consolidated at the request of 
petitioner Perkins. R. 295. 
6. A settlement conference was held on May 2,1995, in Randolph, Utah, which 
was converted to a Prehearing Conference at the suggestion of Chairman W. Val 
Oveson. Both petitioners and respondent agreed to conversion of the settlement 
conference to a prehearing conference. R. 4. A formal hearing was set for July 7, 
1995. R. 5. 
7. On May 22,1995, the Commission entered its Notice and Order, formally setting 
July 7,1995, as the date of the formal hearing, and setting the following pre-hearing 
schedule: 
a. Each party shall prepare exhibits, documents or appraisals and 
exchange the same with the other party by June 3,1995. 
b. Each party shall conduct all discovery and have answered 
questions arising from any discovery by June 30,1995. 
c. Any exhibits, documents or appraisals that have not been shared as 
per the above mentioned schedule and either party has not had the 
opportunity to do discovery on them, will not be allowed as 
evidence in the hearing. 
R. 267-68. 
8. On or about May 30,1995, Lynch and Perkins submitted Interrogatories to the 
6 
respondent. R. 230 and 255. 
9. On or about June 2,1995, respondent provided Lynch and Perkins with copies 
of the appraisals upon which respondent intended to rely at the formal hearing and 
submitted its own requests for discovery. R. 194 and 196. 
10. On or about June 23,1995, petitioners submitted their responses to respondent's 
discovery requests.7 R. 167-175. Petitioners'responses are virtually identical. Both 
responses indicate the appraisals which petitioners intend to submit are verbal and both 
responses fail to identify alleged errors and omissions in the respondent's appraisals, 
which had been provided to petitioners with respondent's June 2, 1995 discovery 
requests.8 
11. On or about June 29, 1995, respondent submitted its responses to the 
interrogatories of petitioner Lynch, together with documents supporting the position 
7
 Although both responses are dated June 23, 1995, the response of Mr. Lynch was 
received by the Appeals Unit of the Tax Commission on July 7, 1995, and the response of Mr. 
Perkins was received by the Appeals Unit of the Tax Commission on June 29, 1995. R. 167 and 172. 
8
 Respondent's discovery requests to Perkins state: "During the settlement conference, 
mention was made by the appellant of possible errors in the BischofFPia appraisal. Please list each 
portion of the appraisal you believe to be in error and provide documentation supporting your claim. 
We must allow the appraisers an opportunity to reconcile or refute any such claim." R. 195, 197. 
Similar language was included in the discovery requests to Lynch. Petitioners' response to this 
discovery request was: "We have not yet completed our review of the BischoffTPia appraisal." R. 
167, 172. 
7 
respondent intended to take at the formal hearing. R. 98-135. 
12. On or about June 29, 1995, respondent submitted its responses to the 
interrogatories of petitioner Perkins, together with additional documents supporting the 
position respondent intended to take at the formal hearing. R. 136-166. 
13. A formal hearing was held on July 7,1995. R. 324 (Transcript of Hearing)9. At 
the hearing, respondent made a motion to exclude any documents or information 
challenging the Pia/Bischoff appraisal based upon petitioners' failure to reply to 
respondent's discovery requests and based, further, upon the fact that petitioners had 
been in possession of the appraisal for ten months prior to the formal hearing. R. 328-
29, Tr. 5-6. Respondent's motion was granted. R. 330, Tr. 7. 
14. Later in the hearing, petitioners introduced evidence concerning the lack of arms-
length transactions and the inclusion of personal property in sales used as comparables 
in the Pia/Bischoff appraisal. R. 429-432, Tr. 106-109. In response to petitioners' 
representations that they had not received the information until after the expiration of 
the June 30,1995 deadline10, the Commission allowed the evidence to be introduced, 
9
 The transcript of formal hearing was electronically recorded and not transcribed until 
June 20, 1996, after petitioners' opening brief was filed. 
10
 The petitioners represented, through Mr. Zulauf, represented that they did not provide 
the respondent with their criticisms of the Pia/Bischoff appraisal for two reasons. First, petitioners 
8 
but granted respondent additional time after the hearing to submit materials to refute 
the untimely evidence. R. 435-436, Tr. 112-113. The Commission specifically stated 
that both petitioners and respondent could submit additional materials in rebuttal of 
evidence presented at the hearing, although no new evidence could be presented. n R. 
436, 462; Tr. 113,139. 
15. Petitioners raised no objection at the hearing to the Commission's ruling 
regarding post-hearing submissions.12 
had not received responses to their interrogatories and wanted to wait to see if the responses 
addressed their criticisms before identifying the specific areas of contention for respondent. R. 430; 
Tr. 107:12-19. The petitioners also represented that the additional information they intended to 
present had not come into their possession until the Sunday before the Friday hearing, which was July 
2, 1995. Petitioners gave no indication of why the information was not provided to the respondent 
between Monday and Friday. 
11
 Respondent has included extensive detail concerning the backdrop against which the 
Commission allowed post-hearing submissions in view of the arguments contained in petitioners' 
opening brief which urge the court to determine that such post-hearing submissions violated 
petitioners' constitutional rights to due process. See Petitioners' Brief, pp. 10, 20-24, 35, etc. It is 
apparent from a review of the transcript that the additional time allowed by the Commission was 
necessitated by petitioners' failure to respond to discovery requests rather than by the Commission's 
desire to thwart petitioners. Recognizing that petitioners were not represented by counsel and may 
have been unfamiliar with the formalities of the appeals process, the Commission clearly acted to 
accommodate petitioners, not respondent, by allowing post-hearing submissions. 
12
 Tax Commission Rule R861-1A-6A gives the Commission wide latitude relative to 
the consideration of evidence and specifically provide for the submission of post-hearing materials: 
. . . [A]ny disclosure of facts shall not prohibit the Commission from 
relying upon facts subsequently discovered at any stage of the 
adjudicatory proceeding. However, the party against which such 
newly adopted legal theories or newly discovered facts are asserted 
9 
16. After receiving post-hearing submissions from both petitioners and respondent, 
the Commission entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision 
in these consolidated cases on October 13,1995. R. 4. 




PETITIONERS' REQUEST FOR REDUCTION 
OF THEIR PROPERTY ASSESSMENTS 
BASED ON ALLEGED DEFECTS IN THE ASSESSMENT 
ROLL, GENERALLY, WAS NOT SUPPORTED 
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
Petitioners assert that the entire assessment roll of Rich County is "fatally 
defective." In support of this broad and far-reaching allegation, petitioners submitted 
at trial an exhibit which purported to represent a random sampling of actual sales of 
properties located within Rich County, contrasted with the values of those properties 
shall have opportunity to argue against such legal theories or refute or 
explain such facts before any order of the Commission is issued. 
[Emphasis supplied.] 
10 
as reflected on the assessment roll of the Rich County Assessor.13 Petitioners argued 
that this exhibit irrefutably established that the values of properties listed on the Rich 
County assessment roll were in error by an average of 55%.14 
Based solely upon this exhibit, petitioners urged the Commission, and now urge 
this court, to determine that the entire assessment roll was fatally defective, thus 
entitling petitioners to the requested reduction in assessed value15. That result is simply 
insupportable. 
Petitioners' exhibit identifies eight parcels of property, comparing their assessed 
value with their actual sales price. Petitioners presented no evidence on the total 
number of parcels located within Rich County which the sampling purports to 
represent. The sampling contains no information concerning the terms of the sales, 
whether the sales are arms-length transactions, whether the sales include personal 
13
 Hearing Exhibit No. 1, R. 47. 
14
 Mr. Zulauf, speaking for both petitioners, acknowledged that item 6 on the exhibit was 
off by only 5%. Explaining the divergence from the average on that particular sale, Mr. Zulauf 
explained that he thought the assessor "got lucky on that one." R. 337, Tr. 14:19. 
15
 Petitioners quote the USPAP standards for developing a mass appraisal, but have 
failed to present any evidence that the Rich County Assessor did not comply with those standards. 
Further, one of the appraisers who was present and did testify specifically stated that the appraisal 
submitted in evidence. Tr. 144:15-19; R. 367. 
11 
property and, if so, the value of the personal property included16, or numerous other 
data that would make the exhibit relevant to a determination of whether properties in 
Rich County, generally, are assessed at their full market value. In fact, Mr. Zulauf 
acknowledged at the hearing that the exhibit does not establish that petitioners' 
assessments are higher relative to the assessments of other Rich County property 
owners. 
[Commissioner] Were you trying to prove then that you are 
tax dis ~ or your assessments are higher relative to the 
others? 
[Mr. Perkins] Some of them. That's true. Most of them. 
[Mr. Zulauf] Yes. They are. 
[Mr. Perkins] Most of the others. 
[Commissioner] Or were you trying to — 
[Mr. Zulauf] Well, but that table doesn't prove that. I 
believe that that's the case, what you stated. I believe the 
16
 The exclusion of this type of information is particularly puzzling in view of petitioners' 
insistence that virtually every sale of recreational or second-home property in Rich County includes 
personal property valued at between $10,000 and $40,000. Perhaps it is not so surprising in view 
of the comments of Mr. Perkins at the hearing (Tr. 41, R. 364): 
[Mr. Zulauf] . . . Again, this is one [1623 East Cisco Road] of the 
sales where — This one sold all the furniture away, 1623. 
[Mr. Perkins] that's one that had some furniture, maybe not all. 
12 
case — I believe our assessments are ~ 
R. 440-441; Tr. 117-118. 
The discussion between the Commissioner and Mr. Zulauf continued and the 
Commissioner ultimately provided some insight concerning the basis for the 
Commission's rejection of the argument and the reason why the Commission found the 
exhibit unpersuasive. 
[Commissioner] No. I didn't say it. I'm trying to ask you 
ifyousaidit. 
[Mr. Zulauf] Well, if I didn't say it, I'm saying it now. I 
believe that their assessments are higher relative to their 
other assessments on the tax roll in proportion. In other 
words, let's take Christensen for example. His was ninety-
eight percent in error. In other words, his property was 
$187,000.00 — sold for $187,500.00, and it was assessed 
at $90,000.00. Clearly, he was getting a tax break 
compared to Mr. Lynch whose property is — is worth 
somewhere $65,000.00 to $75,000.00, and he's being taxes 
at $97,000.00. 
[Commissioner] But the determining factor there is that if 
the — if the property is worth $60,000.00. 
[Mr. Zulauf] Well, even if it's — Let's say it's worth 
$100,000.00. If his is at the very top of market value and 
they've got his appraised within three percent of the value, 
he's paying the correct share he should be paying. But what 
about Christensen over here, he's only paying half of what 
he's supposed to be paying. Some — The money has got to 
13 
go somewhere, somebody has got to be making up for that 
low assessment, and I know who two of them are, it's 
Harold and Gene. 
[Commissioner] Let's move on from this. Again, Mr. Jolley 
indicated to you that the Property Tax Division does do a 
sales ratio study on this very issue each year, who have 
those statistics over time that do not reflect what you have 
just mentioned. Mr. Jolley are you proceeding? 
R. 441-442; Tr. 118-119. [Emphasis added.]17 
If petitioners' Exhibit No. 1 is reflective of any trend, it is an indication that the 
Rich County Assessor undervalues properties on the assessment roll, rather than 
overvaluing them. Had the exhibit been given probative weight for the only proposition 
it supports, the Commission would have been justified in raising the value of 
petitioners' properties. 
In Utah Power & Light v. Utah State Tax Com'n., 590 P.2d 332 (Utah 1979), 
17 See, also, comments of Craig Jolley and Mr. Zulauf at R. 436, Tr. 113: 
[Mr. Jolley] Also, I wanted to comment — well, ask — we 
appreciate your input as far as the mass appraisal program. Weren't 
you aware though that the Tax Commission has the jurisdiction to 
assess the County's ability or their accuracy in performing appraisal 
work and that they do these ratio studies and they do them in a very 
scientific manner, much more so than you've attempted to do here, 
but that they have jurisdiction to do that? 
[Mr. Zulauf] I'm — I'm aware of that. I'm also aware that it's 
inaccurate, so whatever method they're using. 
14 
the Utah Supreme Court determined that in a case where the taxpayer claims an error 
in its assessment, the taxpayer has the obligation to show substantial error in the 
assessment and to provide a sound evidentiary basis upon which the Tax Commission 
may adopt a lower valuation (id. at 335) and noted: 
. . . The universally recognized rule of the actions of 
administrative agencies requires this Court to take some 
cognizance of the expertise of the agency in its particular 
field and accordingly to give some deference to its 
determination, and not to upset the decision unless it appears 
that the action of the Commission is so in error or so unfair 
or unreasonable, that it must be regarded as arbitrary, a 
circumstance which we have not found present here. 
Id. [Footnote omitted.] See, also, Tax Commission Rule R861-1A-7G. 
Here, the Commission allowed petitioners to place Exhibit No. 1 into evidence, 
even though it was untimely. The Commission heard the arguments of petitioners and, 
based upon the lack of probative value of the evidence presented in support of that 
argument, the Commission found the argument to be without merit. 
15 
POINT II. 
PETITIONERS' ALLEGATIONS OF IRREGULARITIES 
IN THE RESPONDENT'S APPRAISAL EVIDENCE 
ARE WITHOUT MERIT 
Respondent first addresses petitioners' position regarding the alleged failure of 
respondent's experts to prepare their appraisals in conformity with applicable federal 
statutes. Petitioners ask this court to direct the Commission and the respondent to 
reduce the assessed value of their properties for tax year 1994 because, inter alia, the 
Commission and the respondent did not know of, conform the evidence presented to 
the Board of Equalization or the Commission to, or otherwise follow the requirements 
of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice ("USPAP"), as those 
standards are set forth in 12 C.F.R. 34, et seq.18, created in connection with the 
enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 
1989 ("FIRREA"). The record, however, supports a contrary conclusion. The 
transcript of the formal hearing indicates that at least one of the respondent's appraisers 
specifically testified that he was aware of the standards and that his appraisal report 
was prepared in conformity with those standards. 
Further, the appraisals submitted by the respondent at the formal hearing and 
18
 Petitioners' Brief, at, e.g., p. 12. 
16 
upon which the Commission chose to rely pass muster under USPAP, as more fully 
discussed below. 
A. Respondent's experts were aware of and prepared their appraisals 
in conformity with USPAP. 
Respondents again submit that petitioners' position in their opening brief may 
have been significantly different had they referred to the transcript of these 
proceedings. During direct testimony at the hearing, Mr. Leroy Pia19 made the 
following statement: 
We were not commissioned to assess the conditions of a 
mass appraisal, we were commissioned to make an appraisal 
of property at 1932 Bear Lake Boulevard that is commonly 
known as the Lynch property. We conducted an inspection 
of the property internally and exterior on July 14, '94 and 
completed that appraisal, complying with guidelines that 
we believe are acceptable guidelines, USAP was noted 
earlier, and we believe that this appraisal complies with 
that. 
[Emphasis added.] 
The record of the hearing clearly contradicts petitioners' position and their 
19
 Because the hearing was electronically recorded and the transcript was not prepared 
until nearly a year after the hearing, it is difficult to determine exactly who is speaking at times. 
Designated in the transcript as "Speaker", this testimony is attributed to Mr. Pia as a result of 
respondent's interpretation of comments before and after the testimony. In any event, however, it 
is clear that the testimony is attributable to one of respondent's appraisal expert witnesses. 
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assertions that the County's experts had never heard of USPAP.20 
B. The comparable sales utilized bv respondent's experts were verified 
at the time the appraisals were prepared. 
A recurring theme throughout petitioners' brief is that the Commission erred in 
allowing respondent's experts to verify sales information a year after the appraisals 
were conducted. Petitioners have misinterpreted or misrepresented both the appraisals 
submitted at the hearing and the post-hearing submissions of the respondent. In fact, 
the comparable properties included in the appraisals submitted by respondent's 
appraisers were verified. 
The Pia/Bischoff appraisal was submitted into evidence and marked at the 
hearing as Exhibit 10 (R. 55-86). The comparables are shown at R. 57-58. The 
disclosure concerning the source of the data obtained by the appraisers to verify the 
information regarding the comparable properties is summarized below: 
Comparable No. 1, 931 East Cisco Road, Laketown, Utah; 
Verified through Rich County records and Buyer - Survey 
Comparable No. 2, Lot 7, Lakota Subdivision, Garden City, 
Utah; Verified through Rich County records and Bill Petersen, 
Agent 
Comparable No. 3,1162 S. Bear Lake Blvd., Garden City, Utah; 
20
 Petitioners' Brief, p. 18:8-9. 
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Verified through Rich County records and Buyer - Survey 
Comparable No. 4, 1623 E. Cisco Road, Laketown, Utah; 
Verified through Rich County Records and Buyer - Survey 
Comparable No. 5, 85 East 200 North, Garden City, Utah; 
Verified through Rich County records and Bill Petersen, Agent 
Comparable No. 6,759 East Gus Rich Lane, Garden City, Utah; 
Verified through Rich County records and Buyer - Survey 
The same is true for the appraisal submitted by Mr. Farrell with respect to the 
Perkins property, although the sources of the data differ slightly: 
Comparable No. 1, 931 E. Cisco Road, Laketown, Utah; 
Verified through County Sales File - and Buyer - Survey 
Note: Same as Comparable No. 1 in Pia/Bischoff Appraisal 
Comparable No. 2,1623 E. Cisco Road, Lakewood [sic], Utah; 
Verified through County Sales File and Buyer - Survey 
Note: Same as Comparable No. 4 in Pia/Bischoff Appraisal 
Comparable No. 3, Lot 69 Sidesway [sic] Subdivision, 
Lakewood [sic], Utah; Verified through County Sales File and 
Buyer - Survey 
Comparable No. 4,1162 S. Bear Lake Blvd., Garden City, Utah; 
Verified through County Sales files 
Note: Same as Comparable No. 3 in Pia/Bischoff Appraisal 
The information that was verified by respondent's experts after the formal 
hearing related only to petitioners' assignments of errors. For example, petitioners 
alleged that the Pia/Bischoff appraisal was faulty because comparable no. 1,931 East 
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Cisco Road, did not account for personal property that was included in the sale. That 
information was apparently not contained in the verification source used by 
respondent's appraisers. As a result, the appraisers took steps to verify the information 
which petitioners provided at the hearing during the ten-day post-hearing period 
allowed by the Commission. 
POINT III. 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND THE FINAL DECISION ARE 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
Because petitioners have failed to marshal the evidence in this case, it may not 
be apparent to the court that each point raised by petitioners at each stage of this tax 
appeal was convincingly refuted. The final section of this responsive brief is, therefore, 
devoted to an extensive discussion of the evidence presented by petitioners and the 
manner in which that evidence was refuted. 
As noted by the Commission in its final decision, the fundamental dispute 
between the parties is the quahty of adjustments to comparable sales in the appraisals 
submitted by respondent's experts. At the formal hearing, petitioners raised a number 
of objections to the appraisals submitted. Each of those objections is addressed below. 
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A The Pia/Bischoff Appraisal of the Lynch Property. 
1. Inclusion ot personal property in two of the six comparable 
sales utilized in the appraisal 
As noted above, petitioners assert that respondent failed to include any 
adjustments for personal property included in comparable sales. In fact, the Pia/ 
Bischoff appraisal shows a $10,000 adjustment for personal property included in the 
sale of comparable no. 5. R. 58. Nevertheless, respondent has never taken the position 
that either the County or its experts are infallible. In fact, the discovery requests 
submitted by respondent specifically requested information from petitioners concerning 
alleged errors in the appraisals so that adjustments could be made prior to the hearing. 
Petitioners alleged at the hearing that personal property valued at $10,000 was included 
in the sale of comparable no. 1, requiring a downward adjustment in that amount. In 
response to this information, respondents conducted an additional inquiry, which 
produced the following information: 
. .. We spoke with Mr. McLean on Monday, July 10, 1995... 
He further reports a refrigerator and stove were included in the 
sale, as were other attached fixtures, but that he brought in beds, 
a sofa and most other furnishings. He admitted a few odds and 
ends such as a mghtstand, and some pictures, were left behind 
by the seller. We included no personal property value in our 
appraisal, and thus wish to adjust for this more accurate 
information. At most a used refrigerator and various other items 
could be worth $ 1,000. This would lower the value indicated by 
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this comparable from $106,860 to $105,860 or $104,860. This 
supports the concluded subject value better than our earlier 
number. 
R. 19 (Exhibit A8 to petitioners' opening brief). 
Petitioners assert (Petitioners' Brie£ p. 19) that they reverified the $10,000 deduction 
they claim is appropriate for personal property included in the sale (Exhibit 2, R. 49). 
Petitioners assert that this reverification supports a deduction of "at least 5% of the sales 
price as personal property" (referring to Exhibit A9, page 3 to petitioners' opening brief) 
[petitioners' post-hearing submission, R. 14]. The reference to this comparable sale found 
at Exhibit A9, page 3; R. 14] states as follows: 
In Sales Comparable No. 1, 931 East Cisco Road, Rosalind 
Sjostrom owned the property and gave it to her son, Richard 
Sjorstrom and his sister. Richard Sjostrom borrowed money 
from his uncle, the father of David J. McLean, Richard 
Sjostrom's cousin. The father, Mr. McLean agreed that Richard 
Sjostrom's debt would be off set for his part of the property; and 
purchased Richard's sister's part. Therefore, Richard sold the 
house to David J. McLean. The lot at the time of sale was 69* 
wide with a house and 69' wide unimproved, [interlineation 
illegible] the unimproved portion was kept by the father. The 
"appraisal" (referred to by Mr. Pia) was done by the bank 
present, a relative of David's wife. The appraisal came in at 
$84,000 but we don't know if the appraisal is for the house with 
69' front footage or 138 feet front footage (69 x 2 = 138). 
Additionally, the appraisal was done by a loan officer and not 
a licensed appraiser. This is what the appraiser, Mr. Pia calls an 
arms length transaction. If the court wishes to verify this 




The court will note that there is absolutely no reference in this somewhat lengthy and 
rambling account which relates in any way to personal property included in the sale or the 
value thereof. Yet petitioners earnestly argue that this "reverification" information must be 
seen by the Commission and this court as superior and more credible than the information 
provided by respondent's expert, which does, in fact, deal specifically with the issue of 
personal property. 
Petitioners assert that "Sale 3 of the BishoflTLynch [sic] appraisal was not verified by 
Respondents" and that "Petitioner verified the sale to included [sic] 10% of the sale price as 
personal property (A9 page 4)." Petitioners' Brief, p. 19. In fact, the issue of whether 
personal property was included in that sale was not raised by petitioners during the hearing. 
In fact, the information included in the Pia/Bischoff appraisal of the Lynch property was 
verified through the Rich County Records and Buyer Survey. R. 57. In fact, petitioners' 
reference in support of their reverification contains no reference at all to this comparable 
sale. The entire text of the referenced page is reproduced here: 
cost no out of pocket expense, but the question is, what would 
it cost him to have the personal property hauled off and 
disposed of? An adjustment that should be included in the sales 
price. 
It appears that reading Mr. Pia's letter, is an attempt to 
justify overlooking adjusting for market conditions at time of 
sale and personal property that should of been made by 
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appraisers. 
If any appraisal indicates bias, it is that of Mr. Pia's, 
paragraph 3 of page 3 of the Pia letter, indicates that appraising 
property at Bear Lake is difficult for appraisers unfamiliar with 
that market place. We agree! Harold Perkins and Gene Lynch 
have tracked all the properties around the lake for the last 15 to 
20 years. We know all the sellers and purchasers and in most 
cases, the Realtors involved in the transactions. 
As pointed out in court, Mr. Pia and Mr. Bishop have 
appraised only one property at Bear Lake in the last 12 months. 
We do not think appraising one property at Bear Lake qualifies 
them as experts on lake front properties. Especially, when they 
don't verify their sales with the buyer, seller or broker and when 
they are unwilling to survey Brokers of what's happening in the 
area. 
Dated August 10, 1995 Respectfully Submitted, 
Gene Lynch and Harold Perkins 
R. 15. 
Petitioners assert that: 
Sale 4 of the Bishoff/Lynch [sic] appraisal was verified to 
included [sic] personal property that had no value by the 
Respondent's appraiser. However, this verification took place 
over 1 year after the appraisal was completed and 19 months 
after the sale had taken place. The Petitioner's [sic] verified this 
transaction at the time of sale to included [sic] 10 to 15% 
personal property. (A9 page 5)." 
Petitioners' Brief, p. 19-20. 
In fact, the issue of whether personal property was included in the sale of comparable 
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no. 4 was not raised by petitioners during the hearing. In fact, the information included in 
the Pia/Bischoff appraisal of the Lynch property was verified through the Rich County 
Records and Buyer Survey. R. 58. In fact, petitioners' reference in support of their 
reverification is non-existent. There is no page 5 either in the record or the copies of 
petitioners' brief exhibit provided to respondent. 
Petitioners assert that: 
Sale 5 of the Pia/Bishoff [sic] letter was conspicuously 
absent of the inclusion of personal property within the sales 
price. Again the appraisers appear to be trying to save face and 
their clients [sic] relationship. As verified by the Petitioners 
(A9 page 5) Sale 5 included 2 boats, 2 wave runners, furniture, 
appliances etc. valued at 11% of the sales price or ($156,000 x 
. 11) $17,050. The Petitioners verified this sale while in escrow 
and verified it with two principles [sic] of the transaction. 
Petitioners' Brief, p. 20. 
In fact, the Pia/Bischoff appraisal received in evidence at the hearing contains a 
deduction of $10,000 for personal property included in the sale related to comparable no. 5. 
R. 58. In fact, the comparison exhibit presented by petitioners at the hearing to refute the 
Pia/Bischoff appraisal shows no deduction for personal property in connection with this sale. 
R. 50.21 
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 Petitioners' Brief acknowledges that the property sold for $155,000. Petitioners' Brief 
at p. 20:5-6. However, the comparison exhibit presented by petitioners at the hearing indicates the 
sales price was $105,000. Accepting all adjustments to value made by petitioners and adjusting this 
comparable sale only to reflect the correct sales price (plus $50,000), the value presented by 
petitioners at the hearing ($62,175 plus $50,000 = $102,175) (Exhibit 2, R. 50) is nearly identical to 
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With respect to comparable no. 6, petitioners' assert: 
Sale 6 was verified by the Respondents appraiser(s) on July 
11, 1995, one year after their appraisal was completed and 
approximately 3 years after the sales took place. Even the 
Respondent's reported $5,000 of personal property inclusive in 
the sales price, supports [sic] the Petitioners [sic] verification. 
The Petitioners verified this sale shortly after it took place with 
Merl Spence, the listing/selling agent. Merl verified the value 
of the personal property to be 10% of the sales price or $10,000 
(A9 page 5). 
Petitioners' brief, p. 20. 
In fact, the comparison exhibit submitted by petitioners at the hearing reflects the 
sales price of this comparable as $75,000. R. 50. Based on petitioners' sales figure and not 
the higher sales figure of $105,000 contained in the Pia/Bischoff appraisal (R. 58), the 10% 
attributable to personal property would be $7,500, not $10,000. Again, the reference in 
support of petitioners' evidence is nonexistent It is, therefore, impossible to ascertain what 
petitioners' evidence is. Did Mr. Spence verify a sales price of $75,000, which included 
personal property valued at $7,500? Did Mr. Spence verify the actual sales price of 
$105,000? The respondent's appraisers did, in fact, seek to confirm the allegations made by 
petitioners during their post-hearing investigation: 
Sale Comparable No. 6,759 East Gus Rich Lane was purchased 
by Mark and Joan Jensen from Dale and Inez Marler in an arms-
length transaction. Mr. Milt Jensen, Mark's brother, confirmed 
this on Tuesday, July 11, 1995 from Veyo, Utah (801) 574-
that presented by respondent's expert ($102,950, R. 58). 
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2749. He also mentioned the purchase price included all 
furnishings down to knives, forks and spoons in the cabin at the 
time. He reported estimated value of such furnishings at $5,000. 
Making this adjustment would change this comparable's value 
indication from $86,475 to $81,475. This widens the value 
range from $83,600 at the lowest (Sale No. 2) to $81,475. This 
widens the value range, the previously concluded value remains 
supported within the range. 
R. 20. 
The evidence in the record which supports petitioners' position is in stark contrast to 
the concrete information provided by respondent's appraisers. In fact, other than the 
ambiguous and unsupported references identified above, the only evidence presented by 
petitioners relating to the value of personal property sold with comparable properties used 
was the testimony of Mr. Zulauf at the formal hearing: 
[By Mr. Bischoff or Pia] You saw the picture and you've 
seen the properties regarding the — and I'm referencing 
the furniture packages, and I'm astonished that you could 
find that there was probably ten thousand or twenty 
thousand worth of personal property items unless there 
was a tractor or a boat or something in there. We've 
done a lot of work in southern Wasatch counties, 
including properties throughout Park City, and, in fact, 
I was personally involved with a model project that cost 
$20,000.00 to furnish out and it was done by an interior 
designer. Explain how you came up with the $10,000.00 
and $20,000.00 personal property adjustments. 
[By Mr. Zulauf] We sat down and figured out what we 
thought it would cost to furnish a house — the house, 
and then in a lot of these cases we couldn't — we didn't 
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get an itemized list of what they were, so when we talked 
to the people, we asked them well, you know, did it go 
with furnishings, and they would say yes, we included 
furnishings, and we didn't ask them for a specific list, we 
said well approximately how much do you think that is 
and they — most of the time they'd say don't know, so 
we'd say well do you uiink it's around $10,000.00 and 
they'd say yes. 
Tr. 124-125, R. 447-448. 
B. The Farrell Appraisal of the Perkins Property. 
Respondent notes that neither Mr. Farrell nor respondent submitted post-hearing 
materials in support of the appraisal of the Perkins property. This can be attributed to 
the fact that only four comparable properties were included in the Farrell appraisal and, 
of those four, three were also identified and discussed in the Pia/Bischoff appraisal.22 
As a result, respondent's summary of evidence in support of the Pia/Bischoff appraisal 
as it relates to comparable properties also applies to the comparable properties used in 
the Farrell appraisal of the Perkins properties. See, also, Point H.B. above for 
information relating to verification of data contained in the Farrell appraisal. 
22
 In the Farrell appraisal, comparable no. 1 is the same as comparable no. 1 in the Pia/ 
Bischoff appraisal; comparable no. 2 is the same as comparable no. 4 in the Pia/Bischoff appraisal; 
and comparable no. 4 is the same as comparable no. 3 in the Pia/Bischoff appraisal. 
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C. Petitioners' deductions relating to appreciation ot properties after 
January 1,1994. 
The other significant area of disagreement between petitioners and respondent 
involves the trend of market values. Petitioners asserted that market values were 
consistently declining until some time after the January 1,1994, lien date. Beginning 
January 1, 1994, property values began to increase at the rate of approximately 15% 
per year. As a result, petitioners argued, the value of the comparable properties utilized 
by respondent's appraisers must be adjusted downward. This "time adjustment" was 
needed to accurately reflect the appreciation of the appreciation which the comparable 
properties enjoyed from the hen date through the date of sale. Petitioners argued that 
the values of the comparable properties23 must be reduced to reflect an appropriate time 
adjustment as follows: 
Comparable No. 1 Minus $2,000 
Comparable No. 2 Minus $6,000 
Comparable No. 3 Minus $23,000 
Comparable No. 4 Minus $3,200 
Comparable No. 5 Minus $22,300 
Comparable No. 6 Minus $3,800 
23
 Again, because three of four comparable properties used in the Farrell appraisal are 
also included in the Pia/Bischofif appraisal and, further, because the discussion at the formal hearing 
and post-hearing submissions centered mostly on the Pia/Bischoflf appraisal, only the Pia/Bischoff 
appraisal is discussed in this subpart. 
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R. 48-50, Hearing Exhibit 2. 
To support appropriateness of the time deduction, petitioners presented Exhibit 
4, entitled "Survey of Value Appreciation since 1-1-94." R. 52. This survey relies on 
the oral representations of four local real estate professionals, which representations 
were summarized in the exhibit. Explaining the exhibit and petitioners' conclusions 
regarding value trends, Mr. Zulauf testified: 
Okay. Now, that sale was based on a survey that we 
conducted with Otto Mattson who is a local real estate 
broker, and we asked him basically if they thought that that 
[sic] the properties had appreciated since January 1st of 
1994, and if so, on an annual basis how much it was, and 
Otto Mattson, who is a local real estate broker, his estimate 
was fifteen percent a year. 
We asked the same question to Merrill — Merl 
Spence, and their estimate was ten percent per year and 
higher for lake front properties. Paul Webb, another local 
real estate broker, we asked him what he thought that 
property values had increased at since January 1st of 1994, 
and his estimate was twenty percent per year, and it was 
based on apparent sales analysis of houses that he had had 
listed for two years for $50,000.00 and they hadn't sold, and 
now they're selling for approximately $75,000.00. 
And then the fourth realtor that we surveyed was Bill 
Petersen, and his estimate was is that properties have 
appreciated about ten percent per year since January 1st, 
1994, and that's the basis for the time adjustments that we 
made on all of our — all of our sales. 
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Tr. 28-29; R. 351-352. 
Petitioners assert that respondent's appraisals failed to make the appropriate time 
adjustment and that petitioners' evidence regarding the appropriateness of the time 
adjustment, generally, and the percentage adjustment, specifically, were completely 
uncontested by respondent. Petitioners' Brief, pp. 21,27. Petitioners also assert that 
respondent's failed utterly to speak with local professionals, finding them to be 
"optimistic and unreliable." 
Petitioners' inability to refer to the transcript in the preparation of their brief is 
again apparent. At the hearing, there was specific testimony from respondent's experts 
concerning their conversations with local real estate professionals. 
We spoke with Mr. Peterson, and he's a — he's a — he's 
a delightful guy. He's a real estate agent as well as an 
Appraiser, which makes it difficult to know when he's 
speaking for what. We didn't ask him about his opinion 
about value increases, we asked him about sales data, 
because we didn't want to use his opinion. What we wrote 
was that there was a peak in the early eighties, somewhere 
very near when Mr. Lynch sold this stuff for a thousand 
bucks a front foot. After that it declined throughout the 
eighties. 
It appeared to us, based on past appraisals over the last few 
years up there, that somewhere around '89 or '91 was 
probably the bottom, and that it kind of sat, as far as value 
trends go, up until somewhere in what we say is from '92 
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until now property values have been increasing moderately, 
but have no regained values of the early eighties. 
Tr. 56; R. 379. 
Regarding the reliability of broker/realtor opinions, respondent's experts 
testified: 
[Zulauf] Oh, right, but would you agree that in the absence 
of a (inaudible) sales analysis and just not doing anything in 
a situation that — that maybe surveying hopefully 
knowledgeable people in the area would be better than just 
doing nothing? 
[Speaker] No. I would not agree. Realtors are notably 
optimistic, their opinions have to be taken with a lot of salt. 
[Zulauf] So you don't rely on brokers' opinions? 
[Speaker] Not ideally. 
Tr. 73, R. 396.24 
In addition to the testimony presented by respondent at the hearing, further 
support for the Commission's decision to reject the time adjustments made by 
petitioners is found in the post-hearing submissions of the parties. From respondent's 
submissions, it is clear that each of the local real estate professionals upon whom 
24
 This specific exchange also refutes petitioners' claim that they were denied the right 
to cross-examine respondent's witnesses. 
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petitioners relied. The following evidence is contained in the record: 
On Tuesday, July 11,1995, Mr. Bill Peterson, broker (801) 
946-3226, reported he thinks there has been a steady 
increase from 1991 through 1995 of roughly 30%. He has 
not seen any dramatic turn-a-round, but did have plenty of 
listings available in 1994, and not much available now. He 
thinks things have tightened considerably in 1995. He 
thinks the increase has been pretty steady, with some 
acceleration in summer 1994 and into this year, 1995. 
R. 21 (Post-hearing submission from Pia/Bischofi). 
Mr. Otto Mattson, broker (801) 946-3305 agreed the market 
peaked in 1982, then plummeted badly through the 1980s, 
when we spoke with him on Tuesday, July 11, 1995. He 
says roughly a 17% decrease in values over 1991 and 1992 
occurred. He reports 1993 and 1994 were very slow for 
marketing time, but values just sat, moving neither up or 
down. He says he has seen a 23% increase in value in the 
last nine months and reports the market has really tightened 
with nothing available on the lake front to speak of. He 
points to a listing from April 1994 at $145,000 which was 
taken off the market, then put back on in June, 1995, and 
sold in one week at $165,000. 
R. 20 (Post-Hearing submission from Pia/Bischoff). 
We spoke with Merl Spence, broker (801) 946-8600 on 
Monday, July 10,1995. She said it is very hard to say there 
has been any clear value trend the last few years. She 
reports a turn-around in 1994 in cabins oh the hills, but no 
real movement of beach front properties. She thinks 
values were relatively stable along the beach from 1991 
through 1994. She thinks it is turning up now in 1995, 
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but was improving only for cabins without lake front 
property in 1994. She admits it is hard to precisely know, 
given the lack of sales along the beach. She says the 1995 
market is tight and anything that comes up for sale moves 
rapidly. 
R. 20 (Post-Hearing submission from Pia/Bischoff). Emphasis added. 
Based upon their verification of the evidence presented by petitioners at the 
hearing, respondent's experts reached the following conclusions: 
This anecdotal evidence appears to us to remain insufficient 
to support significant adjustments to sales ranging from May 
1992 to July 1994, for a valuation date of January 1,1994. 
The first two brokers' [Mattson and Spence] comments 
seem to support no adjustments for a rather slow but neither 
falling nor increasing market in that time, while the third, 
Mr. Peterson, supports some steady increase over that time. 
The point of agreement among the brokers is from the 
summer of 1994 onward when all three point to a tight and 
increasing market. This period, however, is not applicable 
to the subject valuation. 
* * * 
. . . Adjustment for market conditions changing over time 
during the period in question is, in our judgement [sic], still 
insufficiently supported, and no such adjustments are 
applied. The previous value conclusion remains sound. 
R. 21 (post-hearing submission of Pia/Bischoff). 
The post-hearing submissions of respondent directly contradict petitioners' 
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interpretation of Ms. Spence's opinion. Mr. Zulauf s testimony and Exhibit 4 indicate 
that Ms. Spence opined values for lake front properties have increased since the hen 
date an average of 10% per year. The information provided by Ms. Spence to 
respondent's experts indicates no appreciation for lake front properties, but only for 
cabins without lake front property. 
In what appears to be an effort to reconcile the conflicting information provided 
by the same real estate professionals, petitioners advance the following, somewhat 
incredible argument: 
. . . The Petitioners verifications were based on face to face 
interviews (more tiian one) with Merl Spence, Otto Mattson, 
Bill Peterson, and Paul Webb. The interviews were 
conducted by the Petitioners that have owned properties on 
the lake for over 15 years. The petitioners know each of the 
Realtors by sight, are on a first name bases [sic], and freely 
exchange information with each other. These brokers/ 
realators [sic] are some of the principals the petitioners 
verified the personal property included in each of the 
Respondent's sales. The petitioners verify sales and market 
conditions with these Realtors every year. The Petitioner's 
asked the right questions. They surveyed lake front 
properties not property values (all types ..cabins, non lake 
front etc.) in general.... It is unreasonable to assume the 
Respondents appraisers with one day of experience and a 
one to three minutes single phone call can gather better and 
more reliable information than the Petitioners can in two 15 
to 30 minute person to person interviews and follow up 
phone calls. It is also unreasonable to assume realtors/ 
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brokers would divulge more accurate details of sales, to an 
unidentified appraiser on the phone, than they would to 
someone they have known for years.... 
Petitioners' Brief, pp. 22-23. 
Petitioners' argument appears to be that the Commission is only entitled to 
consider the petitioners' interpretation of the local realtors/brokers because those 
individuals would only give accurate information to the petitioners and would be less 
accurate and forthcoming to anyone other than petitioners. Instead of advancing an 
argument that is supportive of petitioners' view, however, petitioners' position clearly 
demonstrates that the Commission correctly accepted the conclusions of respondent's 
experts and disregarded the anecdotal evidence of the local realtors/brokers. 
D. Respondent's calculations concerning value per frontage foot are 
supported by substantial evidence. 
Petitioners make lengthy arguments concerning "land value adjustments" which 
relate to the method by which respondent's experts calculated the value of the real 
property. In fact, these "land value adjustments" are calculations of the value of the 
real property, per front foot, based upon actual sales of properties which occurred in 
Rich County. R. 62. At the hearing, petitioners freely questioned respondent's experts 
concerning the sales used. Petitioners challenged respondent's use of those sales, 
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asserting that only the sales selected by petitioners should be considered. The 
following exchanges between the parties perhaps best illustrate the irreconcilable nature 
of the dispute: 
[Mr. Jolley]... Comparable number one, under location it 
indicates superior with one next to it, we do down to the 
bottom and final — under — he's listed under final 
reconciliation one, lists year round access, closer to water, 
more privacy. 
[Mr. Zulauf] And more privacy. Right. 
[Mr. Jolley] Okay. Those are the three issues I'm 
addressing here. 
[Mr. Zulauf]. Okay. 
[Mr. Jolley] Inspecting these properties, it's apparent that 
these properties are right on the road, the useable buildable 
area is so small that any structure would have to be built 
right against the road. I don't see, and maybe you can 
explain to me, how is it more private. 
[Mr. Zulauf]: Oh, okay. I can explain that to you. Mr. 
Lynch's property is on the — right next to Sweetwater, and 
when the water recedes, their private beach is no longer 
private, it becomes public, and people drive their boats up 
there, they camp on the property, they run up and down the 
beach with four wheel drive vehicles, and so that to me 
means that — that — that Mr. Lynch's property has less 
privacy and this comparable has more privacy, because ~ 
[Mr. Jolley] Were you aware that Ronavue Beach was down 
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around the other side near these properties and that the 
same rights exist when the water goes down on that side 
of the lake as on Mr. Lynch's side of the lake? 
[Mr. Zulauf] Yeah. I just don't think they have as many 
people, and there's — what is it, about five miles? 
R. 417-18; Tr. 94-95. Emphasis added. 
The exchange continued on another topic: 
[Mr. Jolley] Let me ask you about comparables number 
four, five and six, where you've also made a location 
adjustment because you claim these comps are superior and 
you ask $20,000.00, $20,000.00 and $14,000.00. The 
numbers that you have there, number one, if you look down 
below, it says year round access, closer to marina, closer to 
Garden City. The letter that I sent to you guys, would you 
please turn to attachment twelve in that letter? 
[Mr. Zulauf] We have attachment twelve. [R. 135] 
* * * 
[Mr. Jolley] The location of four, five and six are closer — 
you've indicated closer to the marina, closer to Garden City 
and made a sizeable adjustment. Do you also see the comps 
one and two and three on the opposite side of the lake? 
[Mr. Zulauf] Yes. 
[Mr. Jolley] Why did you not make an adjustment for being 
closer to the marina or closer to Garden City in that instance 
where it would have been actually a positive adjustment, 
and why didn't you do that to be consistent with the others? 
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[Mr. Zulauf] Yeah. Well, there's several reasons. As I 
viewed the lake and the properties that I looked at, it seems 
to me like we got two market segments here. There's 
people that are on the side of the lake where we have comps 
one, two and three, and they also have a boat ramp where 
they have access in case they're involved in water sports 
right down by comps one and two. Yeah. And also up by 
three. But I kind of view that as people who want to be oh, 
more secluded, away from the city, and city conveniences 
like water services and things like that. 
[Mr. Jolley] If it's a different market, why did you include 
them in the same analysis and not make adjustments for 
something like that? 
[Mr. Zulauf] Well, because I — from viewing the — the 
sales that we had, it seemed to me like there were two 
different market places, and it just didn't seem to me like 
it would be appropriate to do that. I guess I can't ask you 
questions, but go ahead. 
[Mr. Jolley] It certainly would make it more consistent if 
you applied the same adjustments for all comps rather than 
pick and choose the ones that lower the value is my 
impression. 
[Mr. Zulauf] Well, I don't think so, and that's not what we 
did. That's — It appears to me that there's two distinct 
markets, there's people who want to be close to Garden City 
and the marina, and there's people who don't want to be 
close to that. 
R. 418-21; Tr. 95-98. Emphasis added. 
This exchange illustrates the deference to which petitioners believe their opinions 
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are entitled based solely on the fact that they are property owners in the area. No 
empirical data is offered to support the "two market" theory which is offered to support 
negative adjustments to some comparable properties, but an absence of adjustment in 
cases where adjustment would add to value. This inconsistency, and all other areas of 
disagreement between petitioners and respondent, are to be resolved in petitioners' 
favor because petitioners' opinions support the conclusion petitioners wish to be 
reached. More is required. 
Although respondent may sympathize with petitioners and their inability to 
persuade the Commission to accept the lightness of their position, respondent must 
nevertheless point out that the evidentiary support which petitioners urge this court to 
embrace in order to reverse the final decision of the Commission is comprised of 
nothing more than conclusory statements, speculation, and wishful thinking on the part 
of petitioners. This case is replete with examples to support this conclusion, both 
those extracted and set forth above and others which are not specifically set forth in this 
brief but are nonetheless prevalent throughout the record. 
As noted above, more is required to overcome the deference this court is 
required to afford the Commission's factual findings, which amply support the final 
decision in this case. As this court noted in Hercules, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com 'n, 
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877 P.2d 169 (Utah App. 1994): 
. . . We believe that Utah Power & Light [Co. v. State Tax 
Com % 590 P.2d 332 (Utah 1979)] thus stands for the 
proposition that to prevail in this real property tax dispute, 
Hercules had to accomplish two things during the formal 
hearing before the Commission. First, Hercules had to 
demonstrate that the County's original assessment contained 
error. Second, Hercules had to provide the Commission 
with a sound evidentiary basis for reducing the original 
valuation to the amount Hercules proposed through its 
appraisal experts. 
Id, at 172. 
The submissions of petitioners simply do not provide the sound evidentiary basis 
necessary for this court to set aside the factual findings of the Commission, which 
findings are amply supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
POINT IV. 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE VALUES PLACED 
ON THE PROPERTIES BY PETITIONERS 
AND BY RESPONDENT ARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO 
APPRAISER JUDGMENT AND MERE 
DIFFERENCES OF OPINION 
Dispositive of this appeal is that body of law developed in the State of Utah 
which recognizes that mere differences of opinion as between experts will not suffice 
to set aside the factual findings of an agency subject to judicial review. This principle 
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is set forth in Hercules, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com 'n, supra, where the major 
difference between the values placed on the subject properties were attributable to 
differing expert opinions relative to functional and economic obsolescence. In its 
opinion affirming the decision of the Commission, this court stated: 
While the concepts of functional and economic 
obsolescence are easily grasped in a theoretical sense, the 
task of quantifying the amount of obsolescence appears to 
be an unpredictable undertaking. [Footnote omitted.] The 
testimony of both Mr. Shoup and Mr. Kent demonstrated 
that they were, in the end, simply making educated guesses 
as to the appropriate amounts. In this kind of a case, one 
longs for clarity and easy computation; however, it simply 
does not exist. The appraisers' inability to arrive at 
comparable numbers highlights the difficulty of the task 
rather than their inadequacy. Accordingly, the Commission 
was left with two disparate appraisals that contained 
educated "estimates" of the proper amount of functional and 
economic obsolescence. We defer to the Commission's 
determination that the County's appraisal was more credible 
than Hercules's. Since the County's appraisal was 
supported by substantial evidence, it was reasonable for the 
Commission to accept it. We therefore hold that the 
Commission did not fail to properly account for functional 
and economic obsolescence. 
877 P.2d, at 174-75. See, also, Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Com 'n, 916 P.2d 344 
(Utah 1996) (proper apphcation of appraisal techniques depends upon varying factual 
circumstances that defy generalization; valuation of property for tax purposes is art, not 
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science; it is a function of judgment, not of natural law). 
CONCLUSION 
The differences between petitioners' asserted values and respondent's assessed 
value are attributable to differences in appraiser judgment and differences in application 
of appropriate appraisal theories. The petitioners failed to marshal the evidence on 
appeal and failed to carry their burden of proof, both on appeal and before the 
Commission. The findings of the Commission are supported by substantial evidence 
and may not, under Utah law, be set aside. 
Respondent respectfully submits that the court must affirm the final decision of 
the Commission in this case. 
Respectfully submitted this J__ day of October, 1996. 
Attorneys for Rich County, Respondent 
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RUSSON, Justice: 
**1 Petitioner counties (the Counties) appeal from a 
ruling of the Tax Commission (the Commission) 
adopting a revised property tax assessment of Union 
Pacific Railroad Company's railroad property in Utah 
for the 1990 tax year. The revised assessment was 
agreed upon by Union Pacific Railroad Company 
(Union Pacific) and the Property Tax Division of the 
Tax Commission (the Division), the division 
responsible for assessing property for the Commission. 
We affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On April 30, 1990, the Commission sent Union 
Pacific a notice of assessment, notifying Union Pacific 
that it had $301,320,000 of taxable railroad property in 
Utah. On June 1, 1990, pursuant to section 59-2-1007 
of the Utah Code, Union Pacific filed a petition for 
redetermination with the Commission, claiming that the 
assessment exceeded its fair market value. 
While the 1990 petition was pending, the 
Commission resolved Union Pacific's appeal of the 
Division's 1989 assessment of Union Pacific's railroad 
properties. In 1993, using the earlier decision as a 
guide, the Division and Union Pacific agreed to aher 
the appraisal methodology of the 1990 assessment 
The negotiations between the Division and Union 
Pacific centered on the appraisal methods used by the 
Division in fulfilling its statutory and constitutional 
responsibility to assess the fair market value, as of the 
hen date, January 1, of railroad property. See Utah 
Const art. Xm, §11; Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-104. 
The Division generally employs three recognized 
approaches or indicators of value—cost, income, and 
market-if the indicators are applicable to the property 
under consideration and if reliable information exists to 
apply the indicators. The cost approach determines 
property value on the basis of its cost less depreciation. 
The income approach determines the value of property 
by, first, determining the reasonable income expected 
to be earned by the property and, second, capitalizing 
that income by the return expected to be realized on 
comparable properties in the market to compute the 
present value of the anticipated income. The market 
approach uses the prices at which comparable 
properties are bought and sold as a basis for 
determining the value of the property under 
appraisement. Because railroads such as Union 
Pacific are rarely bought or sold, the Division uses a 
surrogate market approach known as the stock and 
debt approach. Under this indicator, the market value 
of a railroad's property is determined by considering 
the market value of the railroad's common and 
preferred stock in addition to the market value of its 
bonds (or debt). Following application of these 
indicators, the results are reconciled to a single 
estimate by the Division that is based upon its opinion 
of the relative applicability, accuracy, and probity of 
each indicator. Because the indicators are used to 
appraise the value of all of a railroad's holdings, 
including property outside Utah, an allocation factor is 
used to determine the value of the property in Utah. 
The application of these indicators, in light of the 
Commission's resolution of Union Pacific's appeal of 
the 1989 assessment, constituted the subject matter of 
the negotiations between Union Pacific and the 
Division. 
**2 The Division and Union Pacific agreed that in 
light of the Commission's resolution of the 1989 case, 
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the stock and debt indicator should be altered. One of 
the modifications to the stock and debt indicator 
concerned the method of ascertaining Union Pacific's 
stock price. In the 1989 case, the Division and Union 
Pacific presented divergent estimates of Union Pacific's 
value under the stock and debt indicator due to the 
different methods used by each in establishing Union 
Pacific's stock price. Union Pacific used an average 
annual price, while the Division used a year-end stock 
price. Confronted with the choice of deciding which 
method was more appropriate, the Commission chose 
Union Pacific's average annual approach to valuing 
stock. On the basis of the Commission's choice, the 
Division agreed to alter its 1990 valuation of Union 
Pacific's stock using an average annual stock price. 
This reduced the stock and debt indicator of value by 
approximately $110 million. (FN1) 
Union Pacific and the Division also agreed to modify 
the income indicator of value partly on the basis of the 
1989 decision. Under the income indicator, the 
taxpayer's estimated income is discounted by a 
capitalization' rate to convert anticipated income into 
present value. The appraiser can use either direct or 
yield capitalization. In this case, the Division decided 
to use direct capitalization. Under this approach, the 
rate is based upon the earnings-to-price ratios of 
comparable companies and debt rates. (FN2) The 
earnings-to-price ratios are determined by dividing the 
comparable companies* respective earnings by their 
respective stock prices. (FN3) 
Various changes to the income approach used in the 
original assessment resulted in a decrease in Union 
Pacific's value under the income indicator by 
approximately $1.2 billion. The first change was the 
use of the comparable companies' average annual stock 
prices to derive the capitalization rate. In the 1989 
case, the Commission adopted the use of average 
annual stock prices of comparable companies to 
compute the capitalization rate. During its 
negotiations with Union Pacific, the Division agreed to 
do the same, resulting in an increased capitalization 
rate. Dividing Union Pacific's income estimate by the 
higher capitalization rate decreased Union Pacific's 
value under the income indicator. (FN4) 
The third modification to the income indicator was 
not precipitated by the Commission's resolution of the 
1989 case. In formulating earnings-to-price ratios in 
the derivation of capitalization rates, various methods 
are available to determine earnings. In the original 
assessment, the Division used a "straddle" earnings-to-
price ratio. This ratio is calculated by dividing the 
stock price into the sum of the two most recent 
quarters' actual earnings and the next two quarters' 
forecasted earnings. However, in the revised 
assessment, the Division agreed to use a forecasted 
earnings-to-price ratio. Under this approach, the 
earnings are the next four quarters' forecasted earnings. 
The Division made this change because forecasted 
earnings present a better view of comparable 
companies' normalized earnings. 
**3 Following the corrections to the income and 
stock and debt indicators, the Division reconciled all of 
the indicators' results to a single estimate based upon 
its opinion of the relative applicability, accuracy, and 
probity of each indicator. The Division was also 
guided by the Commission's decision in the 1989 case. 
In that case, the Commission adopted a reconciliation 
scheme whereby 80% weight was given to the income 
indicator, 20% was given to the stock and debt 
indicator, and no weight was given to the cost 
indicator. In the settlement appraisal, these weights 
were used again. (FN5) 
After reconciling the indicators into a single value 
estimate, the Division's appraisal for the total railroad 
value changed from $6.2 billion to $5.28 billion. A 
factor to apportion the value of the Utah portion of 
Union Pacific's railroad systems was applied, resulting 
in a $257,136,000 appraisal of market value. An 
equalization ratio of 85.06% was then applied. The 
product of this calculation fixed the railroad's taxable 
value in Utah at $218,719,882, a 27.4% reduction 
from the $301,320,000 original appraisal. In August 
1993, Union Pacific and the Division stipulated to the 
Commission that this revised assessment represented 
the value of Union Pacific's railroad property within 
Utah for ad valorem tax purposes. 
On September 16, 1993, the Commission entered an 
order directing the counties affected by the stipulated 
assessment to show cause why the Commission should 
not accept it as the value of Union Pacific's railroad 
properties in Utah for property tax purposes. On 
October 15, 1993, the Counties sought to raise the 
Commission's estimation of the railroad properties' 
value by filing numerous objections to the revised 
assessment's methodology. 
On June 2, 1994, the Counties' objections were 
presented at a hearing before the Commission through 
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the testimony of Eckhardt Prawitt, the Counties' 
appraisal expert. Most of the Counties' objections 
concerned the Division and Union Pacific's application 
of the income and stock and debt indicators of value. 
The Counties argued that the general use of average 
annual stock prices and bond yields under both 
indicators yielded an estimate of value as of July 1, 
1989, rather than as of the statutory lien date, January 
1,1990. 
The Counties further argued that the settlement 
appraisal's adoption of forecasted earnings and average 
annual stock prices to develop a capitalization rate 
under the income indicator resulted in error. The 
Counties contended that the adoption of forecasted 
earnings caused a mismatch between the earnings and 
the price in the earnings-to-price ratios. Mr. Prawitt 
testified that using average annual stock prices, the 
revised assessment valued comparable companies' 
stock prices as of July 1, 1989. However, using 
forecasted earnings, the expert continued, the 
comparable companies' earnings were the earnings for 
either the last two quarters of 1989 and the first two of 
1990 or the four quarters of 1990, depending on the 
date of the appraisal. Either way, Mr. Prawitt 
concluded, the result is a mismatch between the prices 
and the earnings in the earnings-to-price ratio used to 
calculate a capitalization rate. According to the 
Counties, the better practice is to use the comparable 
companies' actual earnings and stock prices of the final 
two quarters in 1989. 
**4 Finally, the Counties contended that the 
settlement appraisal's use of forecasted earnings to 
develop a capitalization rate conflicted with the 
capitalization of Union Pacific's historical earnings. 
According to Mr. Prawitt, the comparable companies' 
earnings used in the earnings-to-price ratio should 
match the earnings discounted by the developed 
capitalization rate. For example, Mr. Prawitt testified, 
an acceptable appraisal would capitalize Union 
Pacific's year-end earnings, calculated as Union 
Pacific's 1989 income, by a capitalization rate derived 
from the comparable companies' year-end earnings in 
the earnings-to-price ratio. In contrast, Mr. Prawitt 
protested, the revised assessment capitalized historical 
earnings, calculated as Union Pacific's average income 
from 1985 through 1989, at a rate derived from 
forecasted earnings in the earnings-to-price ratio. (FN6 
) 
In response, the Division's appraisal expert, D. Brent 
Eyre, assistant director of the Division, argued that the 
Counties' objections were unfounded He testified that 
the general use of average annual stock prices rather 
than year-end stock prices was consistent with proper 
appraisal methodology. According to Mr. Eyre, use of 
such prices is "well within the confines of what is 
considered one of the appropriate judgments to make in 
the appraisal field." 
Mr. Eyre also argued that in alleging that the revised 
settlement contained a mismatch within its 
capitalization rate, the Counties improperly 
characterized the use of average annual stock prices. 
Mr. Eyre testified as follows: The average annual 
approach to pricing stock does not value stock as of 
July 1 of the previous year. Rather, the aim of the 
average annual pricing approach is to reliably estimate 
the future value of the comparable companies' stock. 
Thus, the use of average annual stock prices did not 
conflict with the use of an earnings-toprice ratio 
calculated with forecasted earnings because the stock 
prices chosen were estimates of future stock prices. 
Mr. Eyre offered a similar rebuttal to the Counties' 
final objection to the revised appraisal's application of 
the income indicator. He testified as follows: 
Contrary to the Counties' contention, there was no 
mismatch between the development of the 
capitalization rate and Union Pacific's income stream. 
Rather, the Counties improperly characterized the way 
in which the revised assessment calculated Union 
Pacific's income. The use of five-year averaged 
income does not produce historical income; instead it 
produces an estimate of Union Pacific's future income. 
Like the use of average annual stock prices, use of five-
year averaged income is justified as a way to estimate 
future income on the basis of an erratic earnings 
history. Put differently, to determine Union Pacific's 
future income, the Division had to consider past 
income that increased and decreased from year to year. 
To obtain an accurate estimate, the average of the 
income over the prior years was used. Thus, Mr. Eyre 
concluded, the use of averaged prior earnings did not 
conflict with the use of a capitalization rate derived 
from forecasted earnings because the averaged income 
was also an estimate of future income. 
**5 Following the hearing, the Commission 
requested supplemental information including the 
methodological basis for the original assessment, the 
underlying methodological basis for any changes to the 
original assessment, and a discussion of whether the 
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original assessment and any subsequent adjustments 
thereto were appropriate representations of fair market 
value. The Division responded with the affidavit of 
Mr. Eyre. Mr. Eyre concluded that the methodologies 
adopted by the Division in the settlement were 
accepted methods for estimating fair market value for 
property tax purposes. Moreover, Mr. Eyre stated, 
many of the adjustments made by the Division were 
accepted by the Commission for the same taxpayer for 
the immediately preceding tax year and the Division 
knew of no change of circumstances concerning Union 
Pacific's railroad operations between the 1989 and the 
1990 tax years that would require significant changes 
in the appraisal methodologies and their applications. 
"Given that the Commission determined the taxpayer's 
1989 fair market value, there is no reason to believe 
that the consistent application of the same methodology 
to this taxpayer in 1990 would not arrive at a value 
consistent with a reasonable estimate of fair market 
value." 
Unlike the Division, the Counties and Union Pacific 
responded to the Commission's request for information 
with briefs. In the Counties' brief, in addition to 
reiterating their objections to the revised assessment's 
appraisal methods, the Counties argued that the 
Commission lacked jurisdiction to consider the 
settlement assessment. The Counties claimed that 
under section 59-2-1007(3) of the Utah Code, the 
Commission had to render a written decision resolving 
Union Pacific's appeal by October 1, 1990. Because 
the Commission had not resolved Union Pacific's 
appeal by that time, the Counties concluded, the 
Commission lacked jurisdiction to approve the revised 
assessment and should reinstate the original 
assessment 
On December 12, 1994, the Commission, 
acknowledging jurisdiction over the matter, issued an 
order accepting the Division's valuation methodologies 
and adopting the revised assessment of Union Pacific's 
railroad properties in Utah. The Counties petitioned 
for review. 
The Counties argue that (1) by delaying a ruling 
approving or disapproving the revised assessment 
beyond the statutory deadline, October 1, 1990, the 
Commission lost jurisdiction over Union Pacific's 
appeal; and (2) the Commission's approval of the 
revised settlement is inconsistent with both generally 
accepted appraisal theory and the Commission's 
statutory guidelines. The Commission and Union 
Pacific respond that (1) the statutory deadline is 
directory only, and the Commission's failure to meet 
the deadline does not result in its loss of jurisdiction 
over Union Pacific's appeal; and (2) the Commission's 
approval of the revised assessment was based on 
factual findings supported by substantial evidence and, 
therefore, the approval should be upheld 
H. ANALYSIS 
**6 The first issue is whether the Commission lost 
its jurisdiction over Union Pacific's appeal by failing to 
issue a written decision by an October 1 statutory 
deadline set forth in section 59-2-1007(3) of the Utah 
Code. The standard of review for this issue is 
governed by section 59-1-610 of the Utah Code. That 
section provides, "When reviewing formal adjudicative 
proceedings commenced before the commission, the ... 
Supreme Court shall ... grant the commission no 
deference concerning its conclusions of law, applying a 
correction of error standard, unless there is an explicit 
grant of discretion contained in a statute at issue before 
the appellate court." Utah Code Ann. § 
59-l-610(l)(b). The proceeding from which the 
Counties appeal was a formal adjudicative proceeding. 
See Utah Admin. Code R861-1A-5. Also, the 
Commission's conclusion that failure to satisfy section 
59-2-1007(3)'s deadline does not divest it of 
jurisdiction is a matter of statutory construction and 
therefore a conclusion of law. See State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). And finally, section 
59-2-1007 contains no explicit grant of discretion to 
the Commission. Thus, section 59-l-610(l)(b) 
demands that we review the Commission's conclusion 
under a correction of error standard. 
Whether a statutory time frame is jurisdictional 
depends on whether the statute's time designation is 
"directory" or "mandatory." A designation is 
mandatory, and therefore jurisdictional, if it is " 'of the 
essence of the thing to be done.' " Kennecott Copper 
Corp, v. Salt Lake County, 575 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 
1978) (quoting 1A Sutherland, Statutory Construction 
§ 25.03 (4th ed.)). However, a designation is merely 
directory, and therefore not jurisdictional, if it is " 
'given with a view merely to the proper, orderly and 
prompt conduct of the business, and by the failure to 
obey no prejudice will occur to those whose rights are 
protected by the statute.'" Id (quoting 1A Sutherland, 
Statutory Construction § 25.03 (4th ed.)). 
The statute at issue in this case provides a means by 
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which disgruntled taxpayers and counties may object to 
property tax assessments made by the Commission. 
Section 59-2-1007 states that dissatisfied taxpayers or 
any county upon a showing of reasonable cause may, 
on or before June 1, apply to the Commission for a 
hearing to voice objections to the Commission's annual 
assessment. (FN7) Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1007(1). 
The statute further provides, "The commission shall set 
a time for hearing the objection and render a written 
decision no later than October 1." Id. § 59-2-1007(3). 
In this case, although Union Pacific timely appealed the 
Division's initial assessment on June 1, 1990, no 
written decision was rendered by the Commission until 
December 12, 1994, over thirty-eight months beyond 
the October 1,1990, statutory deadline. 
**7 In a case recently argued to this court involving 
the Commission and all of the counties that are parties 
to this appeal, we held that section 59-2-1007(3)'s 
October 1 time designation was not mandatory, but 
merely directory and therefore not jurisdictional: 
"[S]ection 59-2-1007(3)'s time designation can only be 
viewed as a guide 'given with a view merely to the 
proper, orderly and prompt conduct' of the 
Commission's business. We hold that the 
Commission's failure to meet the October 1 deadline 
did not result in the loss of jurisdiction over [the 
taxpayer's] appeal." Beaver County v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 289 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 16 (April 25, 1996) 
{PacifiCorp ). Because the Counties' arguments in 
this case are no more persuasive than their arguments 
in PacifiCorp, we apply that holding here. The 
Commission's failure to meet the October 1 deadline 
did not result in a loss of jurisdiction over Union 
Pacific's appeal. 
The next issue is whether the Commission's approval 
of the revised settlement is consistent with generally 
accepted appraisal theory and the Commission's 
statutory guidelines. The Counties challenge three of 
the Commission's findings. The first is that the general 
use of average annual stock prices, rather than year-end 
stock prices, under the stock and debt and income 
indicators is consistent with proper appraisal 
methodology and the statutory mandate that the 
Commission value property for tax purposes as of 
January 1 of each year. See Utah Code Ann. § 
59-2-201(1). According to the Counties, the use of 
average annual stock prices violated that mandate 
because as Union Pacific's stock rose steadily in price 
throughout 1989, the Commission, in effect, valued 
Union Pacific's railroad operations as of July 1, 1989. 
The Counties' second challenge deals with a more 
particular application of average annual stock prices. 
The Counties challenge the Commission's finding 
approving the development of the capitalization rate. 
The employment of average annual stock prices, argues 
the Counties, conflicts with the use of forecasted 
earnings in the development of the capitalization rate 
used to discount Union Pacific's income. The result, 
the Counties maintain, was an impermissible mismatch 
stemming from the use of forward-looking earnings 
and backward-looking stock prices in the earnings-to-
price ratio. 
Finally, the Counties attack the Commission's 
approval of the application of the capitalization rate to 
discount the revised assessment's estimate of Union 
Pacific's income. The Counties maintain that while the 
revised settlement tabulated Union Pacific's income 
using the average of Union Pacific's income from 1985 
through 1989, it discounted that income at a 
capitalization rate calculated with forecasted earnings. 
The result, the Counties contend, is that a forward-
looking capitalization rate was improperly used to 
discount historical earnings. 
Union Pacific and the Commission respond that the 
Counties' challenges amount to attacks upon the 
Commission's findings of fact. Therefore, they argue, 
this court, affording deference to the Commission's 
fact-finding expertise, must apply "a substantial 
evidence standard on review." Utah Code Ann. § 
59-l-610(l)(a). Under such a standard, we must 
uphold the Commission's findings of fact if the findings 
"are supported by substantial evidence based upon the 
record as a whole." Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 
P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1992). Respondents further 
argue that the Commission's findings are supported by 
substantial evidence, namely, the testimony and 
affidavit of Mr. Eyre, assistant director of the Division 
and an expert in the field of appraisal. 
**8 The first question is whether the challenged 
findings are appropriately deemed findings of fact. In 
PacifiCorp, we held that the proper application of 
appraisal techniques was a question of fact: 
The proper application of appraisal techniques 
depends upon varying factual circumstances that defy 
generalization: " '[Valuation is an art, not a science. 
It is a function of judgment, not of natural law.... 
[F]or example—true market value for purposes of ad 
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valorem taxation is always an estimate, always an 
expression of judgment, always a result built on a 
foundation of suppositions about knowledgeable and 
willing buyers and sellers endowed with money and 
desire, whose desires are said to converge in a dollar 
description of the asset.'" 
289 Utah Adv. Rep. at 18 (quoting Utah Assoc, of 
Counties v. Tax Comm'n, 895 P.2d 819, 825 (Utah 
1995) (alteration in original) (quoting Union Pac. 
R.R. v. State Tax Comm'n, 716 F.Supp. 543, 554 
(D.Utah 1988))). Furthermore, in the same case, we 
addressed a nearly identical challenge to the Counties' 
attack on the Commission's approval of average annual 
stock prices. In PacifiCorp, the Counties argued that 
the Commission's acceptance of average annual stock 
prices violated section 59-2-201(1) of the Utah Code, 
directing the valuation of property as of January 1. We 
concluded that "the Commission did not violate section 
59-2-201(1) by approving the use of average annual 
stock prices. The approval is more appropriately 
deemed a factual finding which will be upheld if 
supported by substantial evidence." Id. We will treat 
the Commission's challenged findings in this case 
similarly. The challenged findings shall be upheld if 
supported by substantial evidence. 
As challengers of the Commission's factual findings, 
the Counties bear the burden of demonstrating that the 
factual findings are erroneous. To prevail, the 
Counties must marshal all of the evidence supporting 
the findings and show that despite the supporting facts 
and in light of the conflicting evidence, the findings are 
not supported by substantial evidence. See Zissi, 842 
P.2d at 852; Cornish Town v. Koller, 758 P.2d 919, 
922 (Utah 1988); Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of 
Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah.Ct.App.1989). " 
'Substantial evidence' is that quantum and quality of 
relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a 
reasonable mind to support a conclusion." First Sat'l 
Bankv. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 
1165 (Utah 1990). 
The * first finding-approving the general use of 
average annual stock prices to determine the stock and 
debt indicator and the capitalization rate for the income 
indicator—is supported by substantial evidence. The 
expert of Union Pacific and the Division testified that 
the use of average annual prices is "well within the 
confines of what is considered one of the appropriate 
judgments to make in the appraisal field." In addition, 
Mr. Eyre pointed out, the Commission had approved 
the use of average annual stock prices in its resolution 
of the 1989 case, and he saw no change in 
circumstance that would warrant a departure from the 
previous approach to pricing stock. Because we find 
that the Commission's finding is supported by 
substantial evidence provided by Mr. Eyre, we uphold 
this finding of fact. 
**9 The second challenged finding-approving the 
revised assessment's development of the capitalization 
rate calculated with forecasted earnings and average 
annual stock prices-is also supported by substantial 
evidence. In his affidavit, Mr. Eyre stated that this 
method of developing a capitalization rate was an 
accepted method and consistent with appraisal theory. 
In response to the Counties' allegation of mismatching 
in the development of the capitalization rate, Mr. Eyre 
testified that the Counties mischaracterized the use of 
average annual stock prices. According to Mr. Eyre, 
the stock prices used were not historical stock prices 
but estimates of future stock prices. Thus, Mr. Eyre 
explained, the use of average annual stock prices was 
wholly consistent with the use of forecasted earnings in 
the development of the capitalization rate. Because 
Mr. Eyre's affidavit and testimony are substantial 
evidence supporting the Commission's finding of 
approval, we uphold this finding. 
The last challenged finding—approving the use of a 
capitalization rate developed with forecasted earnings 
to discount Union Pacific's income derived from the 
average of its past five years' earnings—is also 
supported by substantial evidence. Mr. Eyre averred 
that this method was considered a well-accepted 
practice among appraisal experts. And by way of 
reply to the Counties accusation of mismatching 
stemming from the use of a forward-looking 
capitalization rate to discount backward-looking 
income, Mr. Eyre testified that the Counties 
mischaracterized the calculation of income in a manner 
similar to their mischaracterization of the use of 
average annual stock prices. According to Mr. Eyre, 
the five-year averaged earnings were not employed as 
historical earnings but as an estimate of future 
earnings. Thus, Mr. Eyre concluded, the discounting 
of five-year averaged earnings was wholly consistent 
with the use of a capitalization rate derived in part from 
forecasted earnings. Since the Commission's finding 
of approval is supported by substantial evidence, we 
uphold this finding. 
m. CONCLUSION 
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We conclude that (1) the Commission did not lose 
jurisdiction over Umon Pacific's appeal by failing to 
issue a written decision by the statutory deadline, and 
(2) the Commission's challenged findings are factual 
findings that are supported by substantial evidence 
We therefore affirm 
ZIMMERMAN, C J , and HOWE and DURHAM, 
JJ, concur m Justice RUSSONS opinion 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice, separate 
opinion 
I concur with the majority opinion that the Utah State 
Tax Commission did not lose jurisdiction over Umon 
Pacific Railroad Company's appeal by failing to decide 
that appeal with a written decision within the statutory 
deadline specified m Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1007(3) 
I agree that the "deadline" is directory only, not 
mandatory 
However, I do not agree that the various components 
of the valuation formulae that the Commission employs 
m computing a fair market value are properly 
characterized as "factual findings" and that all the Court 
needs to do is determine whether those findings are 
supported by substantial evidence, I e , the opinion of a 
Commission expert that a particular formula or a 
variation of a formula is appropriate For example, 
such issues as whether the Commission can properly 
use future projected earnings combined with a past 
annual average stock price to compute a capitalization 
rate under the income indicator is simply not a factual 
issue In this case, there is no issue as to the accuracy 
of the empirical facts used to calculate the average 
stock price or the future price/earnings ratio The 
issue the Court should decide but does not is the 
propriety of capitalizing earnings by using a past 
average stock price and projected future earnings to 
compute a price/earnings ratio as a tool for valuing a 
corporation 
**10. The Counties contend that the Commission 
employed a "forward looking capitalization rate [that] 
was improperly used to discount historical earnings" 
In my view, the Counties deserve an analysis of that 
issue Instead, the Court offers the unfounded 
conclusion that this issue and several similar issues are 
inherently factual and that the "findings" should be 
sustained because the Commission's expert witness 
testified that such an approach was appropnate 
The propriety of various valuation formulae, as raised 
in this case, cannot be addressed by "findings of fact," 
as that term is ordinarily used Whether the various 
valuation formulae the Commission employs m this 
case are appropnate does not depend upon the 
Commission's findings of empirical data relevant to the 
formula employed. Rather, the propriety of the 
Commission's formulae depends upon whether they are 
logical, reasonable, and produce valuations that 
comport with how similar businesses are usually 
valued and, most importantly, whether the methodology 
meets the standards imposed by Article XIII of the 
Utah Constitution. 
For this Court to exercise its constitutional duty to 
assure compliance with Article XHl, it must evaluate 
Commission decisions to assure that they are based on 
methodologies and formulae that effectuate 
constitutional requirements Of course this Court 
should not, nor could it, engage m a de novo review of 
the Commission's rulings Market valuations are 
concededly inherently judgmental and not subject to 
precise measurements, but valuation methods must be 
based on formulae that are reasonable, consistently 
applied within an industry, and based on realistic 
assumptions and conclusions 
The Commission has developed significant and 
substantial expertise in dealing with highly complicated 
matters of valuation, which, as the majority opinion 
points out, do indeed invohe matters of opinion and 
judgment For that reason, it is appropnate for this 
Court to defer to the Commission's expertise, as long as 
the methodology rests on a reasonable and consistent 
application of sound principles for determining fair 
market value It is hardly appropnate, however, for 
this Court to act as if the Commission's methodology is 
an issue of fact whereby this Court all but abandons its 
constitutional and statutory responsibilities of judicial 
review by treating that which is not a factual inquiry as 
if it were 
FN1 A second alteration to the stock and debt 
indicator dealt with the method of allocating Umon 
Pacific's stock to its railroad operations The 
Division and Umon Pacific agreed to rely solely on an 
allocation approach appro\ed m the Commission's 
resolution of the 1989 case and revised the 
assessment accordingly The result was an 
approximate $390 million reduction in the stock and 
debt indicator 
FN2 " 'Yield capitalization is a method used to convert 
Copynght (c) West Publishmg Co 1996 No claim to ongmal U S Govt works 
1996 WL 364749, Beaver County, Box Elder County, Cache County, Davis County, Iron County, Juab 
County, Millard County, Morgan County, Salt Lake County, Summit County, Tooele County, Utah County, 
Washington County, Weber County v. Utah State Tax Commissi 
Page 8 
future benefits into present value by discounting each 
future benefit at an appropriate yield rate or by 
developing an overall rate that explicidy reflects the 
investment's income pattern, value change, and yield 
rate.'M Utah Assoc, of Counties v. Tax Comm'n, 895 
P.2d 819, 821 a 3 (Utah 1995) (quoting American 
Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, The Appraisal of 
Real Estate 420 (10th ed.1992)). 
FN3. An example of the direct capitalization concept is 
set forth in Beaver County v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 289 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 21 a 2 (April 
25,1996). 
FN4. A second change also led to an increase in the 
capitalization rate. This change dealt with the 
selection of comparable companies whose earnings 
and stock prices would be used to calculate an 
earnings-to-price ratio. The Division and Union 
Pacific agreed to select the same railroad companies 
approved by the Commission in the 1989 case. 
Along with the use of average annual stock prices, 
this resulted in an increased capitalization rate which, 
in turn, further decreased Union Pacific's value under 
the income indicator. 
FN5. This amounted to another change in methodology 
from the original assessment, and although the 
Division could not report with specificity how this 
alteration affected the final outcome, it surmised that 
it may have reduced the final value by about $50 
million. 
FN6. The Counties also objected to the settlement 
appraisal's (1) allocation of Union Pacific's equity to 
its railroad operation under the stock and debt 
indicator, (2) application of the cost approach, and 
(3) reconciliation of the income and stock and debt 
indicators. However, the Counties do not maintain 
these objections on appeal, and therefore, discussing 
them further is unnecessary. 
FN7. The Commission must notify the taxpayer of its 
assessment by May 1 of each year. Utah Code Ann. 
§59-2-201(1), (4). 
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